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                             CHAPTER EIGHT

                  Part Two:  The Living Plant Chapter
                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


       11. The damaging of a living plant is to be confessed.

       "Now a certain Alavi bhikkhu was chopping down a tree.  The
       devata living in the tree said to the bhikkhu, 'Sir, do not
       chop down my dwelling to build a dwelling for yourself.'
       The bhikkhu, paying no attention, continued chopping and
       injured the arm of the devata's child.  The devata thought:
       'What if I were to kill this bhikkhu right here?'  Then
       another thought occurred to her:  'But no, that wouldn't be
       proper.  What if I were to inform the Blessed One of this
       matter?'  So she went to the Blessed One and on arrival
       informed him of what had happened.

       "'Very good, devata.  It's very good that you didn't kill
       the bhikkhu.  If you had, you would have produced much
       demerit for yourself.  Now go, devata.  Over there is a
       vacant tree.  Go into it.' (The Commentary adds here that
       the tree, being in the Jetavana Monastery, was one of the
       choicest pieces of devata real estate in those days.  Other
       devas coming to pay their respects to the Buddha also made a
       point of paying their respects to the devata living in this
       tree.  At any rate:)

       "People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How
       can these Sakyan contemplatives cut down trees and have them
       cut down?  They are destroying one-facultied life.'"

   This is another offense with the four factors of object, effort,
   perception, and intention.

     Object.  The Pali term for living plant -- //bhutagama// --
   literally means the home of a being.  This the Sub-commentary
   explains by saying that devatas may take up residence in plants
   standing in place by means of a longing on which their consciousness
   fastens (at the end of their previous lives) as in a dream.  This
   rule is justified, it says, in that the etiquette of a contemplative
   precludes doing harm to the abodes of living beings.  As the origin
   story shows, though, the reason this rule was laid down in the first
   place was to prevent bhikkhus from offending people who held to the
   animist belief that regarded plants as one-facultied life having the
   sense of touch.

     The Vibhanga defines //bhutagama// as vegetation arising from any
   of five sources:

     1) from bulbs, rhizomes, or tubers (e.g., potatoes, tulips),
     2) from cuttings or stakes (e.g., willows, rose bushes),
     3) from joints (e.g., sugar cane, bamboo),
     4) from runners (e.g., strawberries, couch grass), or
     5) from seeds (e.g., corn, beans).

     According to the Commentary, a whole plant or part of one that has
   been removed from its original place is no longer classed as
   bhutagama.  If it is capable of growing again if placed in the
   ground, it is classed as //bijagama//, which means "home of a
   plant."  When a seed is sown, it is regarded as bijagama until the
   first shoot turns a fresh green color, and the first leaf appears.
   After that it is regarded as bhutagama.

     In line with this criterion, the Commentary classifies as bijagama
   such lower forms of plant life as mushrooms that still have their
   spores, fungi, lichens without leaves, and moulds, in that they do
   not pass through a fresh green stage, have no discernable leaves,
   and yet are capable of regeneration.  Mushrooms that have lost their
   spores, and parts of any plants that have been removed from place
   and will not grow, or that have been cooked or otherwise damaged to
   the point where they are incapable of generation, are not grounds
   for an offense under this rule.

     The Commentary states further that to damage bijagama entails a
   dukkata.  The Vibhanga makes no mention of this point, but the
   Commentary cites as its justification a passage that occurs in a
   number of suttas (D.1, D.2, etc.) saying that bhikkhus refrain from
   harming both bhutagama and bijagama.  The Mahavagga and Cullavagga
   give partial justification to the Commentary's assertion in two
   passages, dealing with bhikkhus eating fruit, which we will discuss
   below.  The Jain ascetics follow similar observances, which suggests
   that both the Buddhists and the Jains adopted this point from the
   ancient Indian ascetics who predated both religions.

     Furthermore, according to the Commentary, there are certain kinds
   of plants that do not count either as bhutagama or bijagama under
   this rule, and to damage them entails no offense.  To justify this
   point it quotes a passage from the Cullavagga (VIII.1.2):  "If a
   varnished wall...(or) finished floor has spots of mould (%), it is
   to be wiped off with a moistened cloth that has been wrung out."
   The Commentary extends the Canon's instructions here to cover not
   only mould on walls but also other lower forms of plant life -- such
   as algae on the inside of water jars, fungus on toothbrushes, and
   mould on food -- that would count as filth if they were allowed to
   continue growing.

     Effort.  According to the Vibhanga, the term //damaging// includes
   such actions as cutting, breaking, picking, burning, and cooking.
   The Commentary defines the term as "dealing with a plant as one
   likes by cutting it, breaking it, and so on."  Although the word
   "dealing with," //paribhunjati//, literally means "making use of,"
   the Commentary's illustrations of what this covers include even such
   things as shaking a tree limb to get the dry leaves to fall off so
   that one can sweep them up.  Thus, it says, //damaging// would
   include picking flowers or leaves, uprooting a plant, engraving
   one's initials in a tree trunk, etc.  Since no exception is made for
   doing such things with "benevolent" intentions towards the plant,
   pruning would be included as well.  Given the catch-all nature of
   the Commentary's definition, using herbicides to kill plants would
   also come under the term "damaging."

     Plants growing in water, such as water hyacinths, whose roots do
   not extend to the earth beneath the water, have the water as their
   base.  To remove them from the water is to damage them, although
   there is no offense in moving them around in the water.  To move
   them from one body of water to another without incurring a penalty,
   one may take them together with some of the water in which they
   originally lived and place them together with that water into the
   new body of water.

     Plants such as mistletoe, orchids, and bird vine that grow on
   trees have the tree as their base.  To remove them from the tree is
   to damage them and so entails a pacittiya.

     Perception.  If one damages a living plant (%) perceiving it to be
   something else -- say, a dead plant -- there is no offense.  If one
   damages a plant in doubt as to whether it is living or dead, then
   regardless of what it actually is, the offense is a dukkata.

     Intention is discussed in detail under the non-offenses, below.

     Making Fruit Allowable.  Since fruit seeds are bijagama, the
   question arises as to how bhikkhus should go about eating fruit.
   The Commentary to this rule discusses in detail two passages, one
   each in the Mahavagga (VI. 21) and the Cullavagga (V.5.2), dealing
   with precisely this question.  The Cullavagga passage reads, "I
   allow you, bhikkhus, to consume fruit that has been made allowable
   for contemplatives in any of five ways:  if it is damaged by fire,
   by a knife, by a nail, if it is seedless, and the fifth is if the
   seeds are discharged."  The Mahavagga passage reads, "Now at that
   time there was a great quantity of fruit at Savatthi, but there was
   no one to make it allowable....(The Buddha said,) 'I allow you,
   bhikkhus, to consume fruit that is seedless or whose seeds are
   discharged, (even if) it has not been made allowable."

     First, to summarize the commentaries' discussion of seedless fruit
   and fruit whose seeds have been discharged:  According to the
   Commentary to the Mahavagga, "seedless fruit" includes fruit whose
   seeds are too immature to grow.  As for fruit whose seeds have been
   discharged, the Sub-commentary states that this means, "Fruit, such
   as mangoes or jackfruit, which it is possible to eat having removed
   the seeds and separating them entirely (from the flesh)."

     The question sometimes arises as to whether bhikkhus may remove
   the seeds themselves before eating fruit of this sort, or whether an
   unordained person has to remove them first, but given the context of
   the Mahavagga passage and the wording of the Sub-commentary's
   explanation, it seems clear that the bhikkhus themselves may
   discharge the seeds before or while eating the fruit.  As the
   Commentary notes, both these kinds of fruit are allowable in and of
   themselves, and need not go through any other procedure to make them
   allowable.

     Other kinds of fruit, though, such as those with numerous seeds
   (such as tomatoes and blackberries) or whose seeds would be
   difficult to remove undamaged (such as grapes) must be damaged by
   fire, a knife, or a fingernail before a bhikkhu may eat them.  The
   Commentary's description of how to do this shows that the damaging
   need only be symbolic:  An unordained person draws a hot object or a
   knife across the skin of the fruit, or pokes it with a fingernail,
   saying "allowable" (//kappiyam//) either while doing the damaging or
   immediately afterward. The Sub-commentary notes that the word for
   "allowable" may be stated in any language.

     If a heap of fruit, such as grapes, is brought to a bhikkhu, he
   should say, "Make it allowable," (//Kappiyam karohi//,) either to
   the donor or to any other unordained person who knows how.  The
   unordained person need only make one of the grapes allowable in line
   with the above procedures for the entire heap to be considered
   allowable, although he/she should not remove the grape from the heap
   while doing so.

     The Sub-commentary claims that the ceremony of making fruit
   allowable must always be performed in the presence of a bhikkhu, but
   the Commentary mentions this factor only in connection with this
   last case -- making an entire heap of fruit allowable by "damaging"
   only one piece -- and not in its basic description of how the
   procedure is done.

     In Communities that follow the Sub-commentary, the custom is as
   follows:  When a donor brings grapes, tomatoes, or similar fruit to
   a bhikkhu, the bhikkhu says, "//Kappiyam karohi// (Make it
   allowable)."  The donor damages the fruit in any of the three
   specified ways and says, "//Kappiyam bhante// (It is allowable,
   sir)," while doing the damaging, and then presents the fruit to the
   bhikkhu.

     In Communities that do not follow the Sub-commentary, the donor
   may perform the act of damaging the fruit beforehand, and simply
   inform the bhikkhu that the fruit has been made allowable when
   presenting it to him.  In either case, the act of making a heap of
   fruit allowable by damaging only one piece //must// be done in the
   presence of a bhikkhu.  And we should note again that seedless fruit
   or fruit whose seeds may be removed entirely from the flesh of the
   fruit are allowable in and of themselves, and do not have to go
   through any procedure before a bhikkhu may accept and eat them.

     The two passages in the Mahavagga and Cullavagga that we have been
   discussing deal specifically only with fruit, but the Commentary
   extrapolates from them to say that the same conditions apply to
   other forms of bijagama, such as sugar cane, and bean sprouts as
   well.

     Non-offenses.  There is no offense for a bhikkhu who cuts a living
   plant --

     //unknowingly// -- e.g., thinking it to be dead,
     //unthinkingly// -- e.g., absent-mindedly pulling grass while
       talking with someone, or
     //unintentionally// -- e.g., inadvertently uprooting grass while
       raking leaves or grabbing onto a plant for support while climbing
       a hill and inadvertently uprooting it.

     Also, there is no penalty in telling an unordained person to make
   an item allowable, in asking for leaves, flowers, etc. without
   specifically saying //which// leaves or flowers are to be picked; or
   in indicating indirectly that, e.g., the grass needs cutting ("Look
   at how long the grass is") or that a tree needs pruning ("This
   branch is in the way") without expressly giving the command to cut.
   In other words, this is another rule where one may avoid an offense
   by using //kappiya-vohara//:  "wording it right."

     The Cullavagga (V.32.1) says that if a brush fire is approaching a
   dwelling, one may light a counter-fire to ward it off.  In doing so,
   one is exempt from any penalty imposed by this rule.

     Also, according to the Sub-commentary to NP 6, a bhikkhu whose
   robes have been stolen and who cannot find any other cloth to cover
   himself, may pick grass and leaves to cover himself without
   incurring any penalty here.

       Summary:  Intentionally cutting, burning, or killing a
       living plant is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       12. Evasive speech and uncooperativeness are to be
       confessed.

   This rule deals with a bhikkhu's behavior in a communal meeting when
   being formally questioned about a charge made against him.  The
   factors for the full offense here are two:

     1) //Intention//:  One desires to hide one's own offenses.
     2) //Effort//:  One continues engaging in evasive speech or in
       being  uncooperative after the Community has brought a formal
       charge of evasive speech or uncooperativeness against one.

     These factors will be easier to understand if we discuss effort
   and intention before going on to the formal act.

     Evasive speech is illustrated in the origin story as follows:

       "Now at that time Ven. Channa, having misbehaved and being
       examined about the offense in the midst of the Community,
       avoided one question with another:  'Who has committed the
       offense?  What was committed?  With regard to what matter
       was it committed?  How was it committed?  What are you
       saying?  Why do you say it?'"

     The Commentary notes that //evasive speech// covers any and all
   forms of speaking beside the point when being formally questioned,
   and not just the ones given in the origin story.  The Sub-commentary
   agrees and gives an additional example of its own:

       "Have you committed this offense?"

       "I've been to Pataliputta."

       "But we're not asking about your going to Pataliputta.
       We're asking about an offense."

       "From there I went to Rajagaha."

       "Well, Rajagaha or Brahmanagaha, did you commit the
       offense?"

       "I got some pork there."

     As for uncooperativeness:

       "Now at a later time Ven. Channa, being examined about an
       offense in the midst of the Community, (thinking), 'By
       avoiding one question with another, I will fall into an
       offense,' remained silent and was uncooperative with the
       Community."

     Thus, the texts say, to be //uncooperative// means to remain
   silent when being formally questioned in the midst of the Community.

     Intention.  This factor is fulfilled only if one is acting out of
   a desire to conceal one's own offenses.  If one has other reasons
   for remaining silent or asking questions while being questioned,
   there is no penalty.  For example, there is no offense for a bhikkhu
   who, when being examined, asks questions or gives answers not to the
   point because he

     does not understand what is being said,
     is too ill to speak,
     feels that in speaking he will create conflict or dissension in
       the Community, or
     feels that the Community will carry out its formal act unfairly or
       not in accordance with the rule.

     The formal act.  If a bhikkhu speaks evasively or is uncooperative
   out of a desire to conceal his own offenses, he incurs a dukkata.
   If the Community sees fit, it may then bring a formal charge of
   evasion or uncooperativeness against him in order to restrain him
   from persisting in such behavior.  If he then continues being
   evasive or uncooperative, he incurs a pacittiya.

     Perception is not a factor here.  Once a formal charge of evasion
   or uncooperativeness has been rightfully brought against a bhikkhu,
   and he continues to be evasive or uncooperative, he incurs a
   pacittiya regardless of whether he sees the charge as rightful or
   not.  If the charge has been wrongfully brought against him -- e.g.,
   the formal act was not carried out strictly in accordance with
   formal procedure -- then in continuing to be evasive or remain
   silent out of a desire to hide his offenses, he incurs a dukkata
   regardless of whether he perceives the charge as wrongful, rightful,
   or doubtful.  In other words, he is not let off the hook simply
   because the Community has not mastered formal procedure.

     If, after the Community rightly brings a formal charge of evasive
   speech or uncooperativeness against a bhikkhu, he continues being
   evasive or uncooperative simply to avoid revealing his offenses, he
   may further be subject to a more severe penalty:  a formal act of
   censure (//tajjaniya-kamma//) for being a maker of trouble and
   strife for the Community (Cv.I.1-8) or -- what is essentially the
   same thing -- an act for further misbehavior
   (//tassa-papiyasika-kamma//) for not admitting to a true charge
   right from the start (see the discussion under the
   Adhikarana-Samatha rules, Chapter 11).

     Non-offenses.  If a bhikkhu answers not to the point or remains
   silent for any of the allowable reasons, he incurs no penalty even
   after a formal act of evasive speech or uncooperativeness has for
   some reason been brought against him.

       Summary: Persistently replying evasively or keeping silent
       in order to conceal one's own offenses when being questioned
       in a meeting of the Community -- after a formal charge of
       evasiveness or uncooperativeness has been brought against
       one -- is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       13. Maligning or complaining (about a Community official) is
       to be confessed.

   Community officials.  In the Cullavagga (VI.21), the Buddha gives
   allowance for a Community of bhikkhus to designate various of its
   members as Community officials, to handle such business as
   distributing food, deciding who will stay in which lodging, keeping
   the rosters that decide who will receive the invitations to which
   meals, etc.  Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was the first such official and
   was well-equipped for the job:

       "As for those bhikkhus who came at night, he would enter the
       fire-element for them and by that light would assign them
       lodgings -- so much so that bhikkhus would arrive at night
       on purpose, thinking, 'We will see the marvel of Ven. Dabba
       Mallaputta's psychic power.'  Approaching him, they would
       say, 'Friend Dabba, assign us lodgings.'

       "Ven. Dabba Mallaputta would say, 'Where would you like?
       Where shall I assign them?'

       "Then they would name a distant place on purpose:  'Friend
       Dabba, assign us a lodging on Vulture's Peak.  Friend Dabba,
       assign us a lodging on Robber's Cliff....'

       "So Ven. Dabba Mallaputta, entering the fire-element for
       them, went before them with his finger glowing, while they
       followed behind with the help of his light."

     Even with his special skills, there were bhikkhus who were
   dissatisfied with the lodgings and meals he assigned to them -- as
   we saw under Sanghadisesas 8 & 9 -- and in the origin story to this
   rule they malign and complain about him.

     Object.  Only a bhikkhu who has been formally agreed upon as a
   Community official fulfills the factor of object under this rule.
   All other people, ordained or not, are grounds for a dukkata.

     Effort. The Commentary and Sub-commentary give the clearest
   description of the distinction between maligning and complaining:
   To malign means to speak critically of a person in the presence of
   one or more other people so as to make them form a low opinion of
   him/her.  To complain means simply to give vent to one's criticisms
   of the person within earshot of someone else.

     According to the Vibhanga, the penalty for maligning or
   complaining about a Community official is a pacittiya if one's
   listener is a fellow bhikkhu, and a dukkata if one's listener is an
   unordained person (%).  The question of who one's remarks are
   addressed to is irrelevant if one is maligning or complaining about
   an unordained person or a bhikkhu who is not a Community official:
   The penalty is a dukkata, regardless of whether the person to whom
   the remarks are addressed is ordained or not.

     Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga says that if a Community official acts
   habitually out of any of the four causes for prejudice --
   favoritism, animosity, stupidity, or fear -- there is no offense in
   maligning or complaining about him.  For example, if he assigns the
   best lodgings to certain bhikkhus simply because he likes them,
   gives the poorest food to certain bhikkhus simply because he
   dislikes them, habitually sends the wrong bhikkhus to the wrong
   meals because he is too stupid to handle the rotating rosters
   properly, or gives the best treatment to certain bhikkhus because he
   is afraid of them or their supporters, there is no offense in
   criticizing his behavior in the presence of others.

     However, one should be very sure of the facts of the case before
   taking advantage of this allowance.  Disappointment and anger have a
   way of coloring one's perceptions, making another person's perfectly
   blameless behavior look biased and unjust.  If one maligns or
   complains about an official, thoroughly convinced that he has been
   acting out of prejudice, one is still guilty of an offense if it
   turns out that in fact the official's behavior has been fair.  The
   same considerations apply also to complaints or criticisms
   concerning anyone, ordained or not.

     To criticize a Community official to his face, simply for the sake
   of hurting his feelings, would be an offense under Pacittiya 2,
   regardless of whether his behavior has in fact been prejudiced or
   not.

     The job of a Community official is often a thankless one.  The
   procedures he must follow in distributing invitations, etc., can be
   fairly complex and, in large Communities, quite time-consuming.
   Since there is no way he can guarantee equal treatment to all, there
   may be times when he seems to be acting out of prejudice when he is
   simply following standard procedure.  If he cannot receive the
   benefit of the doubt from his fellow bhikkhus, there is no incentive
   for him to undertake these duties in the first place.  The Buddha
   likened material gains to excrement (see A.V.196), and when
   excrement is shared out there is rarely any point in complaining
   about who gets the choicest portions.

       Summary: If a Community official is innocent of prejudice:
       Criticizing him within earshot of another bhikkhu is a
       pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       14. Should any bhikkhu set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool
       belonging to the Community out in the open -- or have it set
       out -- and then on departing neither put it away nor have it
       put away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be
       confessed.

   During the four months of the rains, furniture belonging to the
   Community -- when not in use -- is to be kept in a place where it
   will not be rained on, such as a fully-roofed storeroom or lodging.
   During the remainder of the year, it may also be kept in a shed
   roofed with slats or branches, or under a tree where birds do not
   leave droppings.  The Commentary implies, though, that this latter
   allowance holds only in those regions with a distinct dry season;
   and, according to the Sub-commentary, even where there is a dry
   season, if a bhikkhu sees an unseasonable rain storm approaching, he
   should not leave furniture in such semi-open places.

     This rule deals with bhikkhus who set furnishings of the Community
   out in the open and then leave without getting them put away in the
   proper place.  The factors for the full offense are three:

     1) //Object//:  any bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to
       the Community.
     2) //Effort//:  One sets such furnishings out in the open and then
       departs without taking leave, putting the furnishings away, or
       getting them put away in the proper place.
     3) //Intention//:  One has set them out for some purpose other
       than sunning them (%).

     Object.  Any bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the
   Community is grounds for a pacittiya.  Perception is not an issue
   here:  If the item actually belongs to the Community, this factor is
   fulfilled regardless of whether or not one perceives it as such.
   Other furnishings belonging to the Community -- such as carpets,
   bedspreads, mats, foot-wiping cloths, chairs, even the brooms -- are
   grounds for a dukkata, as are furnishings of every type belonging to
   another individual.  One's own furnishings are not grounds for an
   offense.

     According to the Commentary, if one has made an arrangement with
   someone else to use his/her belongings on trust, there is no offense
   in leaving that person's furnishings out in the open.  The
   Sub-commentary adds that furnishings a donor presents for the
   Community to use out in the open -- e.g., stone or concrete benches
   -- are likewise not grounds for an offense.

     Effort. To depart the furnishings is defined as going further than
   one //leddupata// -- approximately 6 meters -- from them.  (A
   //leddupata// is a unit of measure that appears frequently in the
   Canon and is defined as the distance a man of average stature can
   throw a clod of dirt underarm.)  Taking leave, according to the
   Commentary, means informing a bhikkhu, a novice, or a temple
   attendant who agrees to take responsibility for the furnishings.

     Responsibility.  A bhikkhu is held responsible for putting away
   furnishings that he has ordered another person to place in the open,
   unless the other person is also a bhikkhu, in which case //he// is
   the one responsible.  The Commentary states that if a senior bhikkhu
   requests a junior bhikkhu to place out in the open any furnishings
   that may be grounds for a penalty, then the junior bhikkhu is
   responsible for them until the senior bhikkhu sits down on them,
   places an article of his use (such as a robe or a shoulder bag) on
   them, or gives the junior bhikkhu permission to leave, after which
   point the senior bhikkhu is responsible.

     If there is to be an open-air meeting, the host bhikkhus are
   responsible for any seats set out in the open, until the visiting
   bhikkhus claim their places, from which point the visitors are
   responsible.  If there is to be a series of Dhamma talks, each
   speaker is responsible for the sermon seat from the moment he sits
   in it until the moment the next speaker does.

     Non-offenses.  As stated above, there is no offense if one departs
   having set furnishings belonging to the Community or another
   individual out in the sun with the purpose of drying them, and
   thinking, "I will put them away when I come back."  (%)  Also, there
   is no offense if one departs after someone else takes possession or
   responsibility for furnishings one has left out in the open, or when
   there are dangers of any sort -- the Commentary mentions tigers,
   lions, ghosts, ogres, outlaws, and people who might cause one to
   disrobe -- that give one no time to put the furnishings away.

     The Vinaya Mukha, extracting a general principle from this rule,
   says, "This training rule was formulated to prevent negligence and
   to teach one to care for things.  It should be taken as a general
   model."

       Summary:  When one has set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool
       belonging to the Community out in the open:  Leaving its
       immediate vicinity without putting it away or arranging to
       have it put away is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       15. Should any bhikkhu, having set out bedding in a lodging
       belonging to the Community -- or having had it set out --
       and then on departing neither put it away nor have it put
       away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be
       confessed.

   Here again the three factors for a full offense are object, effort,
   and intention.

     Object.  //Bedding// here includes mattresses, pillows, rugs,
   sheets, mats, sitting cloths, blankets, bedspreads, animal skins,
   throw rugs, etc., but not the beds or benches on which they may be
   placed.  Unlike the previous rule, the question of whom the bedding
   belongs to is not an issue in determining the offense under this
   rule.

     The place where it is left, though, //is// an issue.  Bedding left
   in a dwelling belonging to the Community is grounds for a pacittiya.
   Bedding left in a dwelling belonging to another individual is
   grounds for a dukkata, as is bedding left in the area around a
   dwelling, in a meeting hall, or at the foot of a tree -- these last
   three places belonging to the Community or to another individual.
   Bedding left in a dwelling, etc., belonging to oneself is not
   grounds for an offense.  The same holds true for bedding left in a
   dwelling belonging to anyone who has given one the right to use
   his/her belongings on trust.

     Perception is not an issue here.  If, for example, the dwelling
   actually belongs to the Community, it is grounds for a pacittiya
   regardless of whether or not one perceives it as such.

     Effort.  //Putting the item away//, //having it put away//, and
   //taking leave// are all defined as under the preceding rule.  The
   way to determine responsibility for bedding when a bhikkhu orders
   someone else to spread it may also be inferred from the discussion
   there.

     To //depart// is defined as going outside the grounds of the
   monastery.  The absence of any reference to this rule in the duties
   to be done before one's almsround (//pindapata-vatta//)
   (Cv.VIII.5), however, indicates that temporary excursions outside
   the monastery are not counted as "departing."  This conclusion is
   seconded by one of the no-offense clauses, which says that in the
   case of a bhikkhu who goes with the expectation of returning but
   then changes his mind, if he then sends word back to the monastery,
   he avoids any penalty under this rule.  This implies that a bhikkhu
   who leaves his bedding spread out in a dwelling belonging to the
   Community, leaves the monastery temporarily with the intent of
   returning, and returns as planned, incurs no penalty as well.

     The question arises, though, as to how long a temporary period of
   absence is allowable.  The Vibhanga itself sets no time limit.  The
   Commentary illustrates the no-offense clause we have just mentioned
   with the case of a bhikkhu who leaves, thinking, "I will return
   today," but makes no specific statement that longer periods are not
   allowed.

     Since the texts give no specific guidelines here, this is a matter
   that each Community should decide for itself, taking the following
   considerations into account:

     1) The origin story suggests that the purpose of the rule is to
       prevent the bedding's being left so long in an unoccupied
       dwelling that it attracts ants, termites, or other pests.
     2) Another consideration, raised by the Vinaya Mukha, is that if a
       bhikkhu goes for a long excursion, leaving his bedding and other
       belongings scattered about in a dwelling, this might
       inconvenience the resident bhikkhus in that they could not easily
       allot the dwelling to another bhikkhu in the interim.

     Intention is a factor here, in that if one plans to return within
   the allowable space of time but for some reason cannot -- examples
   in the Commentary include flooding rivers, kings, and robbers --
   there is no offense.  And as mentioned above, if one leaves with the
   intention of returning, but then changes one's mind, one can avoid
   an offense by sending word back to the monastery via a messenger.

     Non-offenses.  In addition to the above two cases, the Vibhanga
   says that there is no offense in departing having left bedding
   spread out in a dwelling if someone else has taken responsibility
   for the bedding or if one has taken leave of the resident bhikkhus.
   With regard to this latter point, though, the duties to be done when
   moving out of a monastery (//gamika vatta//) (Cv.VIII.3) include
   putting away the bedding one has been using.  To neglect this duty,
   even when one takes leave of the resident bhikkhus, entails a
   dukkata.

       Summary:  When one has spread bedding out in a dwelling
       belonging to the Community:  Departing from the monastery
       without putting it away or arranging to have it put away is
       a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       16. Should any bhikkhu knowingly lie down in a lodging
       belonging to the Community so as to intrude on a bhikkhu who
       arrived there first, (thinking), "Whoever feels crowded will
       go away" -- doing it for this reason and no other -- it is
       to be confessed.

   There are four factors for an offense here:

     1) //Object//:  a bhikkhu who should not be forced to move.
     2) //Perception//:  One perceives him as such.
     3) //Effort//:  One encroaches on his space in a dwelling
       belonging to the Community.
     4) //Intention//:  One's sole motive is to force him out.

     Object & perception.  //Knowingly// is defined in the Vibhanga as
   knowing that the lodging's current occupant is a senior bhikkhu, a
   sick one, or one to whom the Community (or its official) has
   assigned the dwelling.  The Commentary interprets this definition as
   a list of examples and generalizes from it to include any case where
   one knows, "This bhikkhu shouldn't be forced to move."

     Effort.  To //encroach// means to lie down or sit down in the area
   immediately adjacent to the bhikkhu's sleeping or sitting place --
   which the Commentary defines as anywhere within 75 cm. of the
   sleeping or sitting place -- or on a 75 cm. wide path from either of
   those places to the entrance to the dwelling.  There is a dukkata
   for placing one's bedding or seat in such an area, and a pacittiya
   for each time one sits or lies down there.  To place one's bedding
   or seat in any other part of the dwelling entails a dukkata; and to
   sit or lie down there, another dukkata -- assuming in all of these
   cases that the dwelling belongs to the Community.

     Perception with regard to the dwelling is not an issue here.  If
   the dwelling actually belongs to the Community, this part of the
   factor is fulfilled regardless of whether one perceives it as
   belonging to the Community or not.

     There is a dukkata in encroaching on the space of a bhikkhu --
   intending to force him out -- in the area immediately adjacent to
   such a dwelling, in a place belonging to the Community that is not
   the dwelling of a particular person (e.g., an eating hall), the
   shade of a tree, in the open air, or in a dwelling belonging to
   another individual.  To do so in a dwelling belonging to oneself
   entails no offense.  According to the Commentary, this last
   allowance also applies to a dwelling belonging to anyone who has
   offered to let one use his/her belongings on trust.

     Intention.  If there is a compelling reason -- one is ill or
   suffering from the cold or heat, or there are dangers outside -- one
   may intrude on the space of another bhikkhu without penalty.  The
   reason for these allowances would appear obvious -- one is not
   aiming at forcing the other bhikkhu out -- but it turns out that the
   matter is not as simple as that.  The Sub-commentary reports the
   Three Ganthipadas as saying that because of this allowance, one may
   make an excuse of one's illness, etc., as a pretext for intruding on
   the other bhikkhu's space so as to force him out of the lodging.
   The Sub-commentary tries to argue with this ruling, but the
   Ganthipadas have the support of the Vibhanga here:  Only if one's
   //sole// motive is to force the other bhikkhu out is one subject to
   an offense under this rule.  If one has mixed motives, one may take
   advantage of one's illness, etc., to move in on the other bhikkhu.

     However, once one's illness, etc., has passed, one would commit an
   offense each time one continued to sit or lie down encroaching on
   his space.

     All of this may seem very strange on the surface, but it is likely
   that the original occupant would not feel unduly pressured if an ill
   bhikkhu or one escaping dangers were to move into his dwelling,
   while he //would// start feeling pressured by the continued presence
   of the bhikkhu after the illness or dangers had passed, which is why
   the penalties are allotted as they are.

       Summary:  Encroaching on another bhikkhu's sleeping or
       sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the Community, with
       the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing him
       to leave, is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       17. Should any bhikkhu, angry and displeased, evict a
       bhikkhu from a dwelling belonging to the Community -- or
       have him evicted -- it is to be confessed.

       "At that time some group-of-17 bhikkhus were fixing up a
       large dwelling on the fringes of the monastery, thinking,
       'We will spend the rains here.'  Some group-of-six
       bhikkhus... seeing them, said, 'These group-of-17 bhikkhus
       are fixing up a dwelling place.  Let's drive them out.'  But
       others of them said, 'Wait, friends, while they fix it up.
       When it's fixed up, then we'll drive them out.'

       "Then the group-of-six bhikkhus said to the group-of-17
       bhikkhus, 'Get out, friends.  The dwelling is ours.'

       "'Shouldn't this have been mentioned beforehand so that we
       could have fixed up another one?'

       "'Isn't this a dwelling belonging to the Community?'

       "'Yes....'

       "'Then get out.  The dwelling is ours.'

       "'The dwelling is large, friends.  You can stay here, and
       we'll stay here, too.'

       "'Get out.  The dwelling is ours.'  And, angered and
       displeased, taking them by the throat, they threw them out.
       The group-of-17 bhikkhus, having been thrown out, began to
       cry."



   The three factors for the full offense here are:

     1) //Object//:  a bhikkhu.
     2) //Effort//:  One evicts him from a dwelling belonging to the
       Community.
     3) //Intention//:  One's prime motivation is anger.

     Object.  A bhikkhu is grounds for a pacittiya here, while the
   following are grounds for a dukkata:  a bhikkhu's belongings, an
   unordained person, and an unordained person's belongings.

     Effort.  According to the Commentary, this rule covers both
   physical eviction -- picking up the bhikkhu and throwing him out --
   as well as verbal eviction -- ordering him to leave.  The penalty in
   both cases is the same.  (The Mahasanghikas and Sarvastivadins write
   this point into their version of the rule.)

     There is a dukkata in telling someone else to evict the bhikkhu --
   no allowances for //kappiya-vohara// are given here -- and, assuming
   that all the other factors are fulfilled, a pacittiya once the
   bhikkhu has been evicted.

     To evict a bhikkhu from a dwelling belonging to the Community
   entails a pacittiya.   (Again, perception with regard to the
   ownership of the dwelling is not an issue here.) To evict anyone --
   bhikkhu or not -- from an area immediately adjacent to a dwelling
   belonging to the Community, from a place belonging to the Community
   that is not the dwelling of a particular person, from the shade of a
   tree, from a spot in the open air, or from a dwelling belonging to
   another individual entails a dukkata.  There is also a dukkata for
   throwing a person's belongings out from any of these places.  (In
   all the cases mentioned in this paragraph, the assumption is that
   one is motivated by anger.)

     To evict anyone or anyone's belongings from one's own dwelling --
   or from one that belongs to an individual who has offered to let one
   use his/her belongings on trust -- is not grounds for an offense.

     Intention.  There is no offense in evicting anyone when one's
   primary motive is not anger.  Examples given in the no-offense
   clauses include evicting anyone -- or the requisites of anyone --
   who is insane, shameless in his/her behavior, or a maker of
   quarrels, strife, and dissension in the Community.  The Commentary
   adds here that one also has the right to throw the person out of the
   monastery as a whole if he/she is a maker of quarrels, strife, and
   dissension, but not if he/she is simply shameless.

     Also, one may without penalty evict one's student from his
   dwelling if he is not properly observing his duties.

     In all of these cases, the Sub-commentary notes, if anger happens
   to arise in one's mind in the course of evicting the person, there
   is no offense as long as it is not the primary motive.

       Summary:  Causing a bhikkhu to be evicted from a dwelling
       belonging to the Community -- when one's primary motive is
       anger -- is a pacittiya offense.


                                 * * *


       18. Should any bhikkhu sit or lie down on a bed or bench
       with detachable legs on an (unplanked) loft in a dwelling
       belonging to the Community, it is to be confessed.

   Object.  A bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft is
   grounds for a pacittiya if it is in a dwelling belonging to a
   Community, a dukkata if in a dwelling belonging to another
   individual, and no offense if in a dwelling belonging to oneself or
   to anyone who has offered to let one use his/her belongings on
   trust.  Perception of the ownership, as in the preceding rules, is
   not an issue here.

     The purpose of this rule, as indicated by the origin story, is to
   guard against injury to a bhikkhu living under the loft:  He might
   get hit on the head if any of the detachable legs fall down through
   the floor of the loft.  Thus there is no offense if the loft is not
   high enough off the ground for a man of medium height to stand under
   it without hitting his head; if the floor of the loft is completely
   planked; if there is no one under the loft; if the area under the
   loft cannot be used as a dwelling (e.g., it is used solely for
   storage space, says the Commentary); if the bed or bench with
   detachable legs is on the ground; or if the legs of the bed or bench
   are securely fixed to their frame.

     Effort.  There is a question as to whether //sitting// and //lying
   down// would include standing as well, since the no-offense clauses
   allow one "to stand there and hang things up or take them down."
   The Commentary interprets "there" as a bed or bench with detachable
   legs, but standing on such a thing would seem to be even more
   dangerous than sitting or lying down on it.  More probably, "there"
   refers to the unplanked loft.

     Some people have noted that although the bhikkhu in the origin
   story sat down hurriedly, the word "hurriedly" does not appear in
   the rule, and they speculate that it may have been dropped by
   mistake.  If one is not allowed at all to sit or lie down on a bed
   or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft, they say, there
   would be no reason to have one there.  Actually, beds with
   detachable legs do not sound like wise things to have on an
   unplanked loft, and perhaps the Buddha's purpose in formulating this
   rule was to discourage their being placed there in the first place.

       Summary:  Sitting or lying down on a bed or bench with
       detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a dwelling belonging
       to the Community is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       19. When a bhikkhu is building a large dwelling, he may
       apply two or three layers of facing to plaster the area
       around the window frame and reinforce the area around the
       door frame the width of the door opening, while standing
       where there are no crops to speak of.  Should he apply more
       than that, even if standing where there are no crops to
       speak of, it is to be confessed.

       "Now at that time a chief minister who was Ven. Channa's
       supporter was having a dwelling built for Ven. Channa.  Ven.
       Channa had the finished dwelling covered with roofing
       material again and again, plastered again and again, so that
       the dwelling, overloaded, caved in.  Then Ven. Channa,
       collecting grass and sticks, despoiled the barley field of a
       certain brahmin.  The brahmin was offended and annoyed and
       spread it about, 'How can revered ones go around despoiling
       our barley field?'...Bhikkhus...were offended and annoyed
       and spread it about, 'How can Ven. Channa have a finished
       dwelling covered with roofing material again and again,
       plastered again and again, so that the dwelling gets
       overloaded and caves in?'"

   This rule is an extension of Sanghadisesa 7, giving further
   directions for how a bhikkhu should go about building a dwelling for
   his own use when sponsored by another person.  Since it deals with
   techniques used in building wattle and daub dwellings 2,500 years
   ago, both the rule and its explanations in the Canon and
   commentaries contain terms whose meaning is uncertain at present.
   The syntax of the rule suggests one interpretation, the Commentary
   another, while the Vibhanga is non-committal on the points where the
   two interpretations differ.  Since both interpretations make sense,
   we will present them both here.

     What the rule seems to say.  The area 1.25 meters around the door
   frame is to be covered with up to three layers of plaster or roofing
   material to reinforce it so that when the door is blown open or shut
   it will not damage the wall or be loosened from its hinges.  Five
   kinds of roofing material are mentioned in the Vibhanga:  tiles,
   stones, lime (cement), grass, and leaves.

     Similarly, around the windows, an area the width of the window
   shutters is to be reinforced with up to three layers of plaster to
   protect it from being damaged when the shutters are blown open or
   shut.  Three kinds of plaster were used in the Buddha's time --
   white, black and red-chalk -- and bhikkhus were allowed to apply
   them in a number of geometrical patterns, but not to use them to
   make obscene pictures of men and women on the walls (!)
   (Cv.VI.3.1-2). Although the bhikkhus were allowed to cover the
   entire walls and floor with this plaster, this rule gives directions
   only for the minimum area that should be covered to keep the walls
   strong.

     What the Commentary says.  Because the rule refers to roofing
   material, the Commentary assumes that it must refer to the roof of
   the dwelling, even though this assumption does violence to the
   syntax of the rule.  Its interpretation:  One may reinforce the door
   and window frames with as much plaster or roofing material as one
   likes, but may cover the roof with only three layers of roofing
   material.  A relevant point from the Canon is the passage at
   Cv.VIII.3.3 stating that if at a later date the roof begins to leak,
   the resident bhikkhu -- if he can -- should re-roof it himself or
   arrange for someone else to do it for him.  If he can do neither,
   though, there is no offense.

     The reasons for this rule.  The origin story suggests that the
   Buddha imposed the three-layer limit in order to prevent the
   dwelling from collapsing under the weight of too much roofing
   material, but the no-offense clauses show clearly that the rule is
   aimed at preventing bhikkhus from abusing the generosity of the
   person sponsoring the building work by using too much roofing
   material.  In either case, the Commentary's interpretation has its
   logic, in that an overloaded roof would be more burdensome to the
   dwelling and to the sponsor than an overloaded window or door frame
   would be.

     A supplementary regulation arising from the origin story is that
   one should not perform any building operations, including
   supervising, where grain is growing.

     The offenses here are as follows:  a pacittiya for each piece of
   roofing beyond the allowable three layers, and a dukkata for doing
   or directing the work while standing where crops are growing.  These
   offenses apply regardless of whether one is doing the work oneself
   or having it done.  They also apply whether one is building a new
   dwelling or having an old one repaired.

     Perception is not a factor here.  If one happens to miscount the
   number of layers of plaster or roofing material, one is still not
   immune from an offense.

     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, these regulations do not
   apply to "an abode in a cave, a grass hut, (a dwelling) for the use
   of another, (a dwelling built) by means of one's own resources, or
   anything other than a dwelling."  The Sub-commentary argues from the
   wording of the rule -- the fact that it refers to "a large dwelling"
   -- that the regulations also do not apply to small dwellings built
   to the standard measurement specified under Sanghadisesa 6:  i.e.,
   no larger than 3 by 1.75 meters.

       Summary:  When a bhikkhu is building or repairing a large
       dwelling for his own use, using resources donated by
       another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with
       more than three layers of roofing material or plaster.  To
       exceed this is a pacittiya offense.



                                 * * *



       20. Should any bhikkhu knowingly pour water containing
       living beings -- or have it poured -- on grass or on clay,
       it is to be confessed.

   This is an offense with four factors.

     Object:  water containing living creatures.  The K/Commentary's
   contribution to the next factor shows that this includes things like
   mosquito larvae, but not beings so small they cannot be seen.

     Perception.  One knows that the living creatures are there (from
   having seen or heard them, says the K/Commentary) and that they will
   die from the factor of effort, defined below.

     If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings,
   then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they
   //were// there is to commit a dukkata.

     Effort.  Because of a peculiarity of Pali syntax, this rule can
   also be interpreted as reading, "Should any bhikkhu knowingly pour
   grass or clay -- or have it poured -- in water containing living
   beings, it is to be confessed."  The Commentary states that both
   readings are correct.  It also states that //grass and clay//
   includes any material that would cause death to living beings in the
   water.  Thus actions covered by this rule would include such things
   as emptying old water from a flower vase onto the ground, using
   water to make cement, or pouring a toxic chemical or heavy pollutant
   into the water.

     Unlike some of the other rules that deal with giving orders,
   simply giving the order to pour is enough to fulfill this factor.
   Thus, for example, a bhikkhu who tells someone else to dump an
   aquarium of fish on the floor incurs a pacittiya for giving the
   order and another pacittiya when the other person does as told.

     Intention.  This factor is fulfilled simply by the desire to pour
   the water or to have it poured (or to pour "grass and clay" into the
   water or to have it poured).  As the K/Commentary notes, one need
   not have murderous intent towards the living beings in order to
   fulfill this factor.  For example, if after perceiving that the
   water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their existence and
   pours the water on a burning log -- not to kill the insects, but to
   put out the fire -- one commits an offense all the same.

     Result is not a factor here.  Whether or not the living beings
   actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.

     Non-offenses.  There is no offense in using water containing
   living beings in any of the ways covered by this rule --

     //unknowingly// -- e.g., not knowing that it contains living
       beings; pouring a toxic chemical into the water thinking it to be
       harmless;
     //unthinkingly// -- e.g., heating a kettle of water on the stove,
       seeing that it has tadpoles in it and in a knee-jerk reaction
       dumping the water out on the ground so that they won't be boiled
       to death; or
     //unintentionally// -- e.g., accidentally knocking over a goldfish
       bowl.

     However, a bhikkhu should always check water before using it.  One
   practical method for checking large amounts of water is to look at
   two or three cupfuls as samples:  If no living being are visible in
   the samples, the water may be used without further check.  An
   alternative method is to use a filter, being mindful to return any
   living beings caught in the filter to some other water in good time.

     Watering plants.  The topic of watering plants comes up in the
   Commentary's discussion of the bad habits of the bhikkhus at
   Kitagiri mentioned under Sanghadisesa 13.  There it says that even
   if the water has no discernable life, to use it or have someone else
   use it to water plants with the purpose of corrupting families with
   gifts from the plant, entails a dukkata.  In cases of this sort, one
   is not allowed to use //kappiya-vohara// or any other way of
   indicating one's desire that the plant be watered.

     If one wants to use the fruits or flowers of the plant in other
   ways  -- to eat the fruit oneself, to make a gift of fruit to the
   Community, to use the flowers as an offering to a Buddha image, etc.
   -- one may not water it oneself, but there is no offense in getting
   someone else to water it if one uses //kappiya- vohara// ("Look at
   how dry this plant is !" "If it doesn't get any water, it's going to
   die.")

     If one wants the plant to grow for other reasons -- for the sake
   of its shade or as part of a decorative garden or forest -- there is
   no offense in watering it oneself as long as one uses water with no
   discernable life in it.  Two of the ancient commentaries add that if
   one simply desires shade, a garden, or a forest, one may plant the
   plant oneself as long as one places it in earth that would not count
   as "soil" (//jata-pathavi//) under Pacittiya 10.

       Summary:  Pouring water that one knows to contain living
       beings -- or having it poured -- on grass or clay is a
       pacittiya offense.  Pouring anything that would kill the
       beings into such water -- or having it poured -- is also a
       pacittiya offense.

                            * * * * * * * *